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INTRODUCTION
On February 27, 1998, Richard Myer Banks listened as the court
sentenced him to serve thirty-five months in custody and five years on
supervised release for pleading guilty to a mere single count of bank fraud.1
Seven years later, while on supervised release, he received notice from the
United States Probation Office for the Northern District of Oklahoma that a
planned blood collection would take place on May 17, 2005, to retrieve,
analyze, and store his DNA in a national database in accordance with the
2004 amendments to the DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act of 2000.2
1. See Bank Fraud Act, 18 U.S.C.S. § 1344 (2006) (defining bank fraud as a scheme to
defraud or obtain moneys under false or fraudulent pretenses from federally insured
financial institutions); see also Mehul Madia, The Bank Fraud Act: A Risk of Loss
Requirement?, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 1445, 1445 (2005) (describing the circuit split as whether
the government needs to prove the defendant possessed the criminal intent to victimize the
institution by exposing it to a risk of civil liability or financial loss).
2. See, e.g., United States v. Kriesel, 416 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1041 (W.D. Wash. 2006)
(upholding the compulsory DNA profiling of all felons, as required by 42 U.S.C.S. §
14135(a)(2), as reasonable under the Fourth Amendment because the blood sample was
minimally intrusive, and finding prisoners on conditional release had diminished
expectations of privacy that were outweighed by a legitimate governmental interest in
deterrence).
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Seeking relief from compulsory blood collection and DNA analysis four
years after serving his time in prison and reentering society, Richard Banks
filed suit in the Northern District of Oklahoma for an emergency injunction
to forbid the collection.3 Four other individuals convicted of similar
offenses joined Banks in the suit, all of whom were serving terms of
probation or were on supervised release.4 The District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma granted the government’s motion to dismiss
the plaintiffs’ case because, in applying the special needs test set forth by
the Supreme Court,5 it found that a special need separate from general law
enforcement existed and that the governmental interests outweighed the
plaintiffs’ privacy expectations.6
This Note argues that the 2004 amendments to the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act, which extended compulsory DNA collection to
nonviolent and nonsexual offenders, is a violation of the Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.7 Part
II investigates Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and how the courts have
dealt with challenges to DNA databanking statutes, including the recent
decision by the Northern District of Oklahoma upholding the federal statute
in Banks v. Gonzales.8 Part III.A argues that the district court misapplied
the special needs test when it upheld the constitutionality of the federal
statute in Banks because the purpose of the statute does not fall into any
categorical exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant and probable cause
requirements. Part III.B argues that even if the courts find that a special
need does exist for the 2004 amendments, the intrusion on the privacy
rights at stake outweighs any asserted governmental interests. Finally, Part
III.C challenges the constitutionality of the 2004 amendments in light of
the implications they may have on indexed persons’ innocent family
members through similarities in genetic makeup.

3. Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1250 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (en banc).
4. Id. at 1251.
5. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (reinforcing that a search
unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional when special needs beyond the normal
need for law enforcement make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable).
6. Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1267 (holding that the DNA Act serves a special need
beyond law enforcement objectives, whether it is classified as building a DNA database or
creating a DNA identification index to assist in solving crimes because at the time of
collection the samples provide no evidence “in and of themselves of criminal wrong
doing”).
7. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 390 (1914) (discussing the Framers’
intention to protect the American people from intrusions into their homes and privacy
similar to those protections allowed under general warrants in England for real or imaginary
charges against them).
8. Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1248.
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BACKGROUND
I. THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA
RECENTLY DENIED A FOURTH AMENDMENT CHALLENGE TO THE
COMPULSORY COLLECTION OF SUPERVISED RELEASEES’ AND
PROBATIONERS’ DNA
In the recent case of Banks v. Gonzales, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Oklahoma upheld the constitutionality of the
DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act (“DABEA”) under the Fourth
Amendment by rejecting a challenge by a group of persons serving terms
of probation or supervised release.9
The court analyzed the
constitutionality of compulsory blood extraction for the federal DNA
database from this group of persons under both the special needs test and
the totality of the circumstances test announced by the Supreme Court in
cases regarding searches lacking individualized suspicion.10 Although a
circuit split exists as to what test to apply to DNA indexing statutes, this
Note focuses on the special needs test because it remains the predominant
form of analysis after the Court’s decisions in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond11 and Ferguson v. City of Charleston.12
II. THE DNA ANALYSIS BACKLOG ELIMINATION ACT, THE COMBINED
DNA INDEX SYSTEM, AND THE 2004 AMENDMENTS TO THE ACT
On December 19, 2000, Congress passed the DABEA.13 The fact that
the majority of states, including New York, already maintained DNA
databanks influenced Congress’s decision to pass the DABEA because the
federal legislature saw the need for connecting all states together in a
national database.14 The DABEA originally required persons convicted of
“qualifying federal offenses,” including the most serious crimes such as
sexual assault and murder, to provide a DNA sample to be included in the
Combined DNA Index System (“CODIS”), a national DNA database
maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.15 In passing the U.S.A.
Patriot Act, Congress amended the DABEA in 2001 extending the reach of
compulsory DNA collection to additional crimes, such as any offense of
9. Id. at 1248, 1268.
10. Id. at 1257-59.
11. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
12. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
13. H.R. REP. 106-900(I), at 1 (2000).
14. See, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 1999) (providing for mandated DNA
extraction from sixty-five percent of all convicted felons, requiring that the DNA
information be maintained in a database, and that information be released only in limited
circumstances for law enforcement identification purposes).
15. 114 Stat. 2726 (2000).
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federal terrorism, any crime of violence as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 16, or
conspiracy to commit any of those crimes.16 Congress amended the
DABEA for a second time in 2004 to eliminate the two existing lists of
qualifying offenses and provide a new list that extended the reach of
DABEA to nonviolent and nonsexual offenders.17
III. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT GENERALLY AND THE PRIVACY RIGHTS AT
STAKE WHEN ANALYZING THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE 2004
AMENDMENTS TO DABEA
The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides,
“[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause. . . .”18 When
evaluating whether or not a government official violated an individual’s
Fourth Amendment rights, courts look to whether: (1) there was a
legitimate expectation of privacy involved; (2) a search/seizure occurred;
(3) there was probable cause for the search/seizure to take place; and (4)
the situation fell under an exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant and
probable cause requirements if there was no probable cause present.19
A. The Supreme Court Announced What May Be Considered a Legitimate
Expectation of Privacy Within the Fourth Amendment Context
No right is more sacred, or more carefully guarded, than the right of
every individual to maintain possession and control of his own person, free
from restraint by others.20 The Supreme Court holds steadfastly to the rule
that the Fourth Amendment protects people, not places, and that what a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.21 The Court also
16. H.R. REP. 107-609(I), at 1352-53 (2000).
17. See H.R. REP. 107-609(I) (extending the DABEA to include any felony, any
aggravated sexual abuse offense covered under chapter 109A of Title 18, any crime of
violence defined in section 16 of Title 18 as a crime involving substantial risk that the
person will use physical force against another, and any attempt or conspiracy to commit any
of the offenses therein); see also Flowers v. Indiana, 654 N.E.2d 1124, 1124 (Ind. 1995)
(advancing the notion that nonindexed family members could become suspects to crimes by
analyzing their convicted family member’s DNA in the database).
18. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
19. See generally 1-2 CRIMINAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (MB) § 2.01 (2005) (discussing
the requirements set forth in the Fourth Amendment by the Framers, who intended them to
serve as a restraint upon the activities of government under general warrants).
20. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Union Pac. R. Co. v. Botsford,
141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891)) (stating that the right of personal security “belongs as much to
the citizen on the streets . . . as to the homeowner closeted in his study to dispose of his
secret affairs”).
21. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (concluding that when a
person enters a public phone booth and closes the door behind him his conversation is
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established that wherever an individual may harbor a reasonable
expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion.22
The Fourth Amendment reflects the Framers’ recognition that certain
enclaves should be free from arbitrary government interference.23 The
Supreme Court has recognized many categorical privacy expectations,24 but
the Court must decide others on a case-by-case basis by weighing different
factors to assess the degree to which a search infringes upon individual
privacy.25 In some circumstances, the Court finds a lower expectation of
privacy for certain groups of individuals, such as public schoolchildren in
schools and prisoners in state prison facilities.26
B. A Seizure Occurs Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment When
There is Some Meaningful Interference by the Government in an
Individual’s Possessory Interest
A seizure occurs when there is some meaningful interference with an
individual’s possessory interest in tangible property.27 Courts find a
violation of the Fourth Amendment whenever a police officer restrains an
individual’s freedom to walk away.28 Thus, the Court concludes that a
seizure occurs when an individual remains under the control of law
enforcement officials because any reasonable individual in that position
would not feel free to leave.29
protected by the Fourth Amendment from the unwanted ears of those who might pass by).
22. See id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
23. Compare Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 179 (1984) (holding that open
fields and the area immediately surrounding the home are not protected by the Fourth
Amendment), with Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 601 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the sanctity of the home and characterizing it as the backbone of the Fourth
Amendment’s prohibition of unreasonable searches).
24. See, e.g., Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (asserting that a compelled
surgical intrusion into an individual’s body for evidence may be unreasonable, even if likely
to produce evidence of a crime).
25. See Payton, 445 U.S. at 589-90 (recognizing that the bright line drawn around a
person’s home deserves the most scrupulous protection from government invasion based on
its roots in clear and specific constitutional terms); see also United States v. Chadwick, 433
U.S. 1, 7-8 (1977) (suggesting that the intention of the Framers to protect persons, not
places, from generalized searches should be given more weight in analyzing Fourth
Amendment challenges).
26. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002) (asserting that “a student’s
privacy interest is limited in a public school environment where the State is responsible for
maintaining discipline, health, and safety” and analogizing it to requirements for children to
submit to physical examinations and vaccinations).
27. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992).
28. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 n.16 (1968).
29. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (citing “examples of
circumstances suggesting a seizure including, the threatening presence of several officers,
the display of a weapon by an officer, physical touching of the person of the citizen, or the
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C. A Search Occurs Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment When
the Government Infringes Upon an Individual’s Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy
When state actors infringe upon an expectation of privacy that society is
prepared to consider reasonable, a search occurs within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.30 For example, the Court found that the government’s
use of a surveillance device unavailable to the general public to explore
details of the home hidden from plain view constituted a search.31
Similarly, the Court found that compelled surgical intrusion into an
individual’s body implicated expectations of privacy, such that the
intrusion may be unreasonable even if likely to produce evidence of a
crime.32
D. Probable Cause Must Exist To Support a Search and Seizure or It Must
Fall Into One of the Exceptions to Fourth Amendment Requirements
Probable cause to search a person or property exists where the facts and
circumstances would justify a reasonable person concluding that he or she
will uncover items connected with criminal activity.33 A court will excuse
failure to comply with the warrant requirement if exigent circumstances
exist; the Supreme Court has delineated additional categories of exceptions
to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the Fourth
Amendment.34
1. The Supreme Court Set Forth Categories That Are Exempt From the
Fourth Amendment Probable Cause and Warrant Requirements
The Supreme Court announced specific exceptions to probable cause and
warrant requirements to eliminate inconvenient barriers to effective law
enforcement.35 The major categories of exceptions to the probable cause
and warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment are consent searches,
use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance with the officer’s request might
be compelled”).
30. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 115 (1984) (explaining that an initial
invasion into Jacobsen’s package by employees of a freight company did not violate the
Fourth Amendment because of the private nature of the actions).
31. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that the use of
Thermovision imaging in the home in order to detect whether a suspect was growing
marijuana was an unlawful search because of its ability to explore details of the home that
would previously have been unknowable without physical intrusion).
32. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985).
33. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 694 (1996).
34. See generally Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (holding
warrantless searches incident to arrest or hot pursuit are justified exceptions to the warrant
requirement).
35. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1968).
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emergency searches to protect life, property, or evidence, automobile
searches, searches in close proximity of the borders, searches conducted in
accordance with the plain view doctrine, and administrative searches.36
Searches conducted in accordance with the Court’s “special needs” test are
another group of exceptions and serve as the focus of this Note because
they are the exceptions claimed by the government to justify suspicionless
DNA collection.37
2. The Court’s Special Needs Exception Covers Many Categories of Cases
That Do Not Easily Fit Into Any Other Exception
The Supreme Court recognizes a special needs exception to the warrant
and probable cause requirements to eliminate the requirement of
individualized suspicion in certain instances.38 This special needs test first
appeared in Justice Blackmun’s concurring opinion in New Jersey v. T.L.O.
and states that a court should only apply a careful balancing of
governmental and private interests in those extraordinary circumstances
where the warrant and probable cause requirements are unreasonable.39
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Court introduced the following two-part
framework: (1) the court must decide whether a special need for the search
and seizure exists that is completely separate from the general needs of law
enforcement; and (2) if a special need separate from law enforcement does
exist, the court must then balance the gravity of the intrusion on the
individual’s expectation of privacy against the weight of the legitimate

36. See Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983) (articulating the “plain view doctrine
as allowing police, when they observe a piece of evidence in plain view during a lawful
search, to seize such evidence because the owner’s remaining interests in the object are
merely of possession and ownership”); Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978)
(upholding regulatory schemes allowing warrantless searches of pervasively regulated
industries or businesses, such as liquor and firearm dealers or underground mines); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 877 (1975) (recognizing that the Immigration and
Nationality Act gives federal officers authority to stop and interrogate any person
reasonably believed to be an alien without a warrant); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 249 (1973) (concluding that the determination of voluntariness required for consenting
to a search did not necessitate proof of knowledge of a right to refuse); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925) (justifying the automobile search exception based on the
mobility of a vehicle such that it can be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction, and stating
that requiring a warrant in such circumstances is impracticable); Hopkins v. City of Sierra
Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding that the warrantless entry into a house may
be justified where police believed someone was inside beating another person).
37. See United States v. Sczubelek, 255 F. Supp. 2d 315, 323 (2003) (mem.) (finding
the DNA Act reasonable because there was a special need for stocking CODIS that was
separate from general law enforcement and that such a goal outweighs intrusion on
defendant’s diminished expectation of privacy).
38. See, e.g., Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (permitting exceptions for
special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, where the warrant and probable
cause requirements are impracticable).
39. 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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governmental interests at stake.40 In Griffin, the Court held that it was
reasonable under the special needs doctrine to dispense with the warrant
requirement because the governmental interests in safety outweighed a
probationer’s expectation of privacy in his home.41
More recently, the Supreme Court struck down two searches in cases
where the Court did not find a special need beyond law enforcement.42 In
Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the Court held that suspicionless drug
screenings of pregnant women at a hospital did not qualify as a special
needs exception to the probable cause and warrant requirements of the
Fourth Amendment.43 The Court also struck down suspicionless sobriety
checkpoints in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond as not justified, even in light
of drunk driving concerns, because its primary purpose was to uncover
evidence of criminal wrongdoing.44 In these cases, the fact that the purpose
for the searches was not completely separate from the needs of general law
enforcement essentially meant failure under the special needs test.45
The Supreme Court also analyzed another ambit of case law under the
special needs exception that instead of turning on the purpose turned on the
interests prong of the test.46 These cases involve searches in public schools
and in prisons.47
40. 483 U.S. at 874.
41. Id. at 873-74; see also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (holding
that reasonable suspicion, not probable cause, was sufficient to compel a search of a
probationer where such a search was specifically part of the conditions of probation
imposed on him by the sentencing judge).
42. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 82-83 (2001) (finding that the
policy of a public hospital to conduct suspicionless drug screenings of pregnant women did
not fit within the closely guarded category of special needs); City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000) (reiterating that the Court will never approve a sobriety
checkpoint program whose primary purpose is to detect evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing because it is not a special need beyond the normal need for law enforcement
that justifies the lack of individualized suspicion).
43. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (finding the involvement of law enforcement pervasive in
implementing the drug-screening program based on the incorporation of the police’s
operational guidelines and the attention to the chain of custody of the results and the range
of possible criminal charges).
44. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42; cf. Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444,
455 (1990) (upholding a sobriety checkpoint program because it clearly aimed to reduce the
immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways).
45. Compare Edmond, 531 U.S. at 44 (striking down a vehicle drug checkpoint
program because it was designed to discover and interdict illegal narcotics, which was a
purpose the Court concluded was virtually indistinguishable from ordinary aspects of crime
control), with Griffin, 483 U.S. at 874 (upholding the warrantless search of probationer as
valid because of the state’s special need to supervise probationers and suspicion of criminal
conduct).
46. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657-58 (1995).
47. See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 831 (2002); Tribble v. Gardner, 860
F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1988) (reiterating settled law that prisoners lose only those rights in
conflict with serving legitimate penological needs, such as securing the safety of guards and
other inmates).
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a. There Is a Special Needs Exception When Dealing With the Rights
of Schoolchildren in the State’s Custodial Care
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton, the Court upheld random drug
testing of student athletes by balancing the substantial need of teachers and
administrators to obtain order in schools and the safety of students against
the lower expectation of privacy student athletes have in public schools and
the minor invasiveness of the urine collection scheme.48 A few years later,
in Board of Education v. Earls, the Court once again upheld the
constitutionality of a school’s suspicionless drug testing policy in light of a
student’s limited privacy interest in a public school environment, where the
State is responsible for maintaining discipline, health, and safety.49
b. There Is a Special Needs Exception When Dealing With the Privacy
Rights of Incarcerated Prisoners
The Court applied similar reasoning when upholding restrictions on
prison inmates’ constitutional rights in light of a state’s interest in
maintaining order in its prison system.50 In Turner v. Safley, the Supreme
Court announced a four-factor test to determine whether restrictions on
prisoners’ rights were a constitutional violation or a reasonable penological
policy.51 This Note will analyze the constitutional claim of a group of
persons whose rights are in between those of free citizens and those of
prisoners or schoolchildren: individuals on supervised release from prison
and probationers.

48. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 665 (cautioning against suspicionless drug testing by stating
that the most significant element in this case was that the policy was undertaken in
furtherance of the government’s responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian
and tutor of children entrusted in its care).
49. Earls, 536 U.S. at 830 (elaborating on the limited privacy expectation of students in
the public school system by stating how schoolchildren are routinely required to submit to
physical exams and vaccinations against disease).
50. See Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 525 (1984) (characterizing lawful
incarceration as carrying with it the loss of those rights inconsistent with legitimate
penological objectives, such as losing protection against unreasonable searches and seizures
inside one’s prison cell because it is in conflict with the need for institutional security).
51. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1987) (describing the relevant factors as: (1)
whether there is a valid, rational connection between the regulation and legitimate
governmental interests put forward to justify it; (2) whether there are alternative means of
exercising the asserted constitutional right that remain open to the inmates; (3) whether and
the extent to which accommodation of the asserted right will have an impact on prison staff
and other inmates’ liberty; and (4) whether the regulation represents an exaggerated
response to prison concerns, the existence of a ready alternative that fully accommodates the
prisoner’s rights at a minimal cost to valid penological interests being evidence of
unreasonableness).
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ANALYSIS
Until the Supreme Court reconsiders the issue of the constitutionality of
the DABEA as applied to the Fourth Amendment, the special needs test
remains the controlling test for analyzing the issues raised in Banks.52
I. THE DISTRICT COURT MISAPPLIED THE SPECIAL NEEDS TEST WHEN IT
UPHELD THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE DABEA IN BANKS V.
GONZALES
The court in Banks misapplied the purpose prong of the special needs
test when it found that the purposes behind the 2004 amendments to the
DABEA were divorced from general law enforcement and instead were to
build a DNA database to more accurately identify suspects for assistance in
solving both past and future serious crimes.53 The court also incorrectly
applied the interests prong of the test, stating that the intrusion on
plaintiffs’ Fourth Amendment privacy protections was nominal when
compared to the governmental interests served.54 There must be a special
need outside of the general demand for law enforcement and a situation
where the governmental interests asserted outweigh the infringement on the
plaintiffs’ privacy rights in order to determine that the district court’s
holding was correct.55
A. The Purposes Behind the 2004 Amendments Directly Relate to the Law
Enforcement Objectives of Assisting in the Solving of Crime
The suspicionless search and seizure to which the Banks plaintiffs are
subject under the 2004 amendments to the DABEA are per se unreasonable
unless the government can prove that there is a purpose beyond the normal
need for law enforcement in taking blood samples for DNA analysis from
all convicted felons, regardless of their crimes.56 The special needs test is a
52. See generally H. Brendan Burke, Comment, A “Special Need” for Change: Fourth
Amendment Problems and Solutions Regarding DNA Databanking, 34 STETSON L. REV.
161, 164 (2004) (recognizing that the Ninth Circuit went against the great weight of case
law in applying a totality of the circumstances test in United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d
813 (9th Cir. 2004) because the special needs test remained Supreme Court precedent on the
issue).
53. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000) (announcing that one of the underlying
concepts behind CODIS is to create a database of convicted offender profiles and use it to
solve crimes for which there are no suspects).
54. See Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1266 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (en banc)
(concluding that a special need existed beyond normal law enforcement, and that the
governmental interests in identifying suspects and crime solving outweighed the plaintiffs’
privacy interests).
55. See id. (indicating that the asserted governmental needs are difficult to justify
because they debatably cannot be distinguished from a general interest in crime control,
which does not fall under a special needs exception).
56. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding the DNA statute
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difficult one to pass because the previously asserted interests accepted by
the court and furthered by the 2004 amendments—identification for
purposes of crime solving, identification for purposes of violation of
supervised release, and combating recidivism—all arguably relate to
normal law enforcement objectives.57 The goal of the search and seizure of
plaintiffs is to link them to a specific past or future crime by their indexed
DNA.58 This purpose falls within the sphere of general crime control that
has always required a measure of individualized suspicion.59
The government states that the key function of the DABEA is not
general crime control but, instead, is merely identification.60 However, it is
difficult to see the distinction in this claim.61 The goal of the DABEA is to
take blood samples from all convicted felons, analyze the DNA, and store
the results in a nationwide database for use in solving past and future
crimes.62
Moreover, this interest in identification is not an interest separate from
general law enforcement but, instead, is exactly what law enforcement aims
to accomplish.63 The cases that the Supreme Court used to carve out the
special needs exception are cases in which officials conducted the search in
question for purposes other than solving and punishing crime.64
because of “the high rate of recidivism among the sexual offenders in addition to the fact
that DNA evidence is particularly useful in investigating sexual offenses and identifying the
perpetrators because of the nature of the evidence left at the scenes of these crimes”).
57. See H.R. REP. NO. 106-900(I), at 27 (2000) (stating that the stored DNA samples and
“DNA analyses may be used for law enforcement identification purposes and virtually
nothing else”).
58. See Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (listing the interests asserted by the government
that are served by the DNA Act, one being to solve both past and future crimes).
59. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41-42 (2000) (holding that
the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program contravened the Fourth Amendment because
its purpose was to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing while employing no
individualized suspicion).
60. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 668 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[R]ecognizing that
identification of felons is related to law enforcement, but that it was not a purpose that
automatically condemned the New York DNA-indexing statute” because it did not try to
“determine that a particular individual had engaged in some specific wrongdoing.”).
61. See United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130, 1137 (E.D. Cal. 2002), rev’d
2005 U.S. App. LEXIS 5913 (9th Cir. Apr. 8, 2005) (noting that “the Supreme Court only
justified suspicionless searches of inmates, probationers, or supervisees when the
government referenced some interest in institutional security, order, and discipline, but
never for law enforcement objectives”).
62. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, USING DNA TO SOLVE COLD CASES 4 (2002)
(stating that increasing the number of convicted offender DNA profiles against which
officials can compare forensic DNA evidence makes the DNA database system a more
powerful tool for law enforcement).
63. See, e.g., Debra A. Herlica, DNA Databanks: When Has a Good Thing Gone Too
Far?, 52 SYRACUSE L. REV. 951, 967 (2002) (citing case law that made exceptions to the
need for probable cause or articulable suspicion of ongoing criminal activity when the
action did not have a primary purpose of catching criminals).
64. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 657 (1995) (including
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However, the primary purpose served by the DABEA is to have a
nationally accessible databank with the DNA prints of all convicted felons,
regardless of their offenses, to promote general crime control and law
enforcement.65 Thus, the purpose behind the DABEA and the 2004
amendments, which extended the DNA testing to nonviolent and nonsexual
felons, does not fall within the exception to the warrant and individualized
suspicion requirements for “special needs” outside of general law
enforcement.66
B. The Asserted Governmental Interests in Banks Do Not Fall Within Any
of the Regulatory or Safety Categories That the Supreme Court Carved Out
as Special Needs Exceptions
The situation in Banks is distinguishable from previous special needs
exception cases because the challenged 2004 amendments have no
regulatory or safety purpose, but rather Congress enacted them to assist in
catching criminals without individualized suspicion.67 This justification
fails the first prong of the special needs test analysis because it does not fall
into any of the well-defined exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.68
1. The Privacy Rights of Plaintiffs in Banks Differ From Those of
Schoolchildren Subject to the Special Needs Exception of Running a State
Education System
The Banks case differs from New Jersey v. T.L.O. because the plaintiffs
in Banks were not subject to the control of the public education system, but
random urine testing of high school student athletes to prevent injury and drug dependency
in the ambit of special needs exception cases); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489
U.S. 602, 670-71 (1989) (holding that blood and urine tests of railroad employees to prevent
railroad accidents falls within the special needs exception to the warrant and probable cause
requirements).
65. See Claire S. Hulse, Dangerous Balance: The Ninth Circuit’s Validation of
Expansive DNA Testing of Federal Parolees, 35 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 31, 33 (2005).
66. See Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 529 (9th Cir. 1991) (remanding
case to determine whether the warrantless entry into a house was justified where police
believed an assault to be in progress because, in such exigent circumstances, the warrant
requirement became impractical); United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 620 (1977)
(construing border searches as exceptions to the warrant and probable cause requirements
because the Fourth Amendment stems from the right of the sovereign to control over who
and what may enter the country subject to constitutional limitations).
67. See Vore v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (D. Ariz. 2003)
(distinguishing the DNA act from unconstitutional programs because the DNA samples
were collected to supply the CODIS database with profiles and did not, on their own, give
any evidence of crime).
68. See United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 782 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
person concealing dangerous explosives in a home where the suspect may have been
suspicious of police presence constituted exigent circumstances to justify officers entering
the home without a warrant to search and seize any illegal weapons found inside).
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rather are adults complying with terms of release in society.69 Justice
Blackmun’s concurring opinion in T.L.O. announced that the special needs
exception applied to situations where exceptional circumstances exist,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, that make the warrant
requirement impracticable.70 Such a situation is clearly present in public
schools, where school officials must maintain order and protect students
from everyday dangers, such as drug use.71 No such situation exists when
dealing with adults who served their time and reentered society.72
Banks also differs from both Vernonia and Earls because both decisions
upholding urine testing of students relied heavily on the school’s custodial
responsibility and authority and the safety of the students.73 The public
school environment, where the State has the responsibility of maintaining
health, discipline, and safety, limited students’ privacy interests.74
However, plaintiffs’ privacy interests in Banks are not so restricted because
they are on release or probation terms and integrating themselves back into
the general population of society.75
More importantly, the Court noted in both Vernonia and Earls that it put
weight on the limited involvement of law enforcement officials in finding
that there was a special needs exception in those contexts.76 However, in
69. But see New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 351, 348-50 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring).
70. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (explaining that as a practical matter,
conducting a stop and frisk could not be subjected to the warrant requirement because a law
enforcement officer must be able to take immediate steps to ensure his safety).
71. But see id. at 350 (Powell, J., concurring).
72. See id. at 340-41 (recognizing that while probable cause and the warrant
requirement are indicative of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment, neither is
required for a finding of reasonableness in the public school context).
73. See Bd. Of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 838 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v.
Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 654 (1995) (stating that schoolteachers and administrators stand in
loco parentis over the minor children entrusted to them and that this subjects the children to
greater controls and more limited privacy rights to protect their health and well-being).
74. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (citing T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 350) (reiterating that “apart
from education, the school has the obligation to protect pupils from mistreatment by other
children, and also to protect teachers from violence by few students whose conduct in recent
years has prompted national concern,” which in turn limits students’ privacy rights).
75. Compare Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 654 (indicating unemancipated minors lack some of
the most fundamental rights because they are subject to the control of their parents or
guardians), with Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) (asserting that
“prison cases are instructive for the court because the constitutional rights of parolees are
even more extensive than those of inmates” and the right to bodily privacy is fundamental
and applies to a parolee submitting to drug testing), and Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321,
325 (9th Cir. 1988) (striking down a prison policy of suspicionless digital rectal cavity
searches because the policy compromising the prisoner’s bodily integrity did not serve a
legitimate penological need).
76. Earls, 536 U.S. at 833; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658 (discussing the degree of the
intrusion and noting that only a limited number of school personnel saw the results of
students’ urine tests and the results were not turned over to law enforcement authorities or
used for any internal disciplinary function); cf. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67,
82 (2001) (discussing indications that the program’s primary purpose was for law
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Banks the extraction of blood from plaintiffs is directly entangled with law
enforcement and aimed at the prosecution and solving of past and future
crimes.77 The stated interest in identification is merely a secondary purpose
served by the statute, which the Supreme Court has held is not dispositive
of the special needs analysis.78 As the Ninth Circuit stated, it would be
“intellectually dishonest” to try to divorce the special needs of the DNA
database from the normal needs of law enforcement.79
2. The Searches Conducted on Plaintiffs in Banks Differ From Special
Needs Exceptions Near the Borders and Ports of Entry
One category of special needs exception cases deals with searches near
the United States borders.80 Courts have long upheld various types of
searches near the border, on both persons and their property, because of
Congress’s broad authority to regulate commerce between the United
States and foreign nations.81 This authority also stems from a longstanding
belief in the sovereign’s right to protect itself and that which enters its
borders.82 The plaintiffs in Banks clearly differ from plaintiffs in such
border cases because they are United States citizens currently residing in
this country.83
In border search exception cases, the Court narrowly defined what could
be included in that special needs exception.84 It has repeatedly held that the
enforcement and noting the lack of a special need shown by the program being developed
by prosecutors, police, and hospital staff to discover and produce evidence of a specific
individual’s criminal wrongdoing).
77. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 (condemning the urinalysis program because of the
extensive involvement of law enforcement officials); Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d
1248, 1266 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (en banc) (conceding that the asserted governmental interests
of identification for purposes of crime solving and violations of supervised release, and
combating recidivism, all arguably relate to law enforcement).
78. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 46 (2000) (finding that a lawful
secondary purpose of keeping impaired motorists off the highways does not justify a
checkpoint program set up to discover illegal narcotics).
79. See Vore v. United States Dep’t of Justice, 281 F. Supp. 2d 1129, 1136 (D. Ariz.
2003) (inferring from legislative history that the purposes of the DNA Act were to match
DNA samples from crime scenes where there are no suspects, to increase the accuracy of the
criminal justice system, and to prevent violent felons from repeating their crimes in the
future).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 619 (1977).
81. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 881 (1975).
82. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620 (finding that no different constitutional standard
should apply to searching envelopes just because they were mailed and not carried into the
country, since the critical fact at issue was that the envelopes crossed the border and entered
this country).
83. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 875.
84. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 617 (addressing the fact that the same Congress that passed
the act for broad customs authority later passed the Fourth Amendment, indicating that
Congress did not find warrantless searches and seizures at the border unreasonable within
the Amendment).
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plenary customs power differs from the more limited power of the
government to enter and search any particular dwelling house, store,
building, or other place without a warrant.85
The special need to protect the borders is strongest when dealing with
searches of persons or vehicles 100 miles from the border and with
suspicious international mail entering the country.86 Plaintiffs in Banks fit
into none of the situations in which a special need to protect the borders
and sovereignty of this country allow searches upon less than probable
cause.87
3. Courts Should Differentiate Plaintiffs in Banks From Owners of
Regulated Businesses
The courts have long held that just as the warrant requirement applies to
an individual’s home, person, and possessions, it also applies to a person’s
place of business.88 The Supreme Court announced an exception to the
warrant requirement in the closely guarded special needs of heavily
regulated businesses, such as liquor stores, firearms dealing, and
underground mining.89 Unlike the plaintiffs in Banks, these businesses
have a long history of government oversight and no reasonable expectation
of privacy.90 The element that distinguishes these closely regulated
enterprises from ordinary businesses and persons, such as the plaintiffs in
Banks, is the long tradition of government supervision of which any person
85. See id. at 616 (contrasting the constitutional difference between the government
entering and searching any ship or vessel, where there is reason to suspect goods subject to
duty are concealed, from the more limited power to enter a citizen’s home).
86. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 884 (holding that officers require more leniency
when patrolling the border because of the problems illegal aliens cause in the country but
must still point to articulable facts to justify stopping a vehicle and questioning its
occupants).
87. See Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1251 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (en banc)
(naming five plaintiffs in the case, all of whom were serving terms of probation or
supervised release in the Northern District of Oklahoma).
88. See Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 369 (1968) (recognizing a long-settled rule
that a citizen has standing to object to a search of his office, as well as of his home, because
a person has an expectation that he will not be disturbed except by personal or business
invitees).
89. Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 600 (1981); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States,
413 U.S. 266, 271 (1973) (acknowledging that a businessman entering into a regulated
industry, in effect, consents to the restrictions the government places upon him and both the
burdens and benefits of his trade); United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972);
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 77 (1970) (finding that business
people in the liquor industry should already be aware that it is subject to high regulation
when entering into it because of the long history of laws governing inspection of liquor
distilleries, even contemporaneous with the passing of the Fourth Amendment).
90. See, e.g., Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 313 (1978) (observing that the
owner of a plumbing and electrical business did not voluntarily subject himself to
warrantless searches of the premises because that industry did not fall under the highly
regulated areas often allowing exceptions to warrant requirements).
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who chooses to enter such a business must already be aware.91
4. There Are No Exigent Circumstances Present to Justify a Special Needs
Exception to the Warrant Requirement for the Searches of Plaintiffs in
Banks
The Court has created another category of special needs to excuse the
warrant requirement in situations where exigent circumstances are
present.92 In these cases, the courts have consistently held that, for
warrantless entry into and search of a person’s home to be valid, officers
must have probable cause to believe that contraband or evidence of a crime
exists inside, they must know of exigent circumstances at the time of the
intrusion, and they must not have had sufficient time to secure a warrant.93
The searches conducted on the plaintiffs in Banks do not fall within the
exigent circumstances category of a special needs exception.94 First, the
probation office has no probable cause, given the totality of the
circumstances known at the time it ordered the blood collection, to believe
that it will find evidence of a crime.95 Second, no court could find any
exigencies present for collecting and analyzing the plaintiffs’ DNA in
Banks.96 With the large passage of time between the actual crimes
plaintiffs committed and the order for their DNA collection, a court should
find that the officials lacked exigent circumstances to justify the
warrantless intrusion into plaintiffs’ privacy interests.97

91. Cf. Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (explaining that the courts convicted all five
plaintiffs of crimes that, prior to the 2004 amendments, would not have subjected them to
forced DNA collection under the DABEA).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Lindsey, 877 F.2d 777, 780 (9th Cir. 1989) (reiterating
the rule that “entry into a person’s home is so intrusive that such searches always require
probable cause regardless of whether” a special needs exception excuses the warrant
requirement).
93. See, e.g., Hopkins v. City of Sierra Vista, 931 F.2d 524, 527 (9th Cir. 1991).
94. Cf. Lindsey, 877 F.2d at 781 (emphasizing the exigencies present when officers are
dealing with guns, dangerous explosives, or apprehension of a drug courier because of the
immediacy of danger to the officers or others).
95. See Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1251 (providing that the court sentenced the most
recently convicted plaintiff, two years earlier, to five years probation and that no plaintiff
recently committed any crimes or probation violations).
96. Cf. White ex rel. White v. Pierce County, 797 F.2d 812, 815-16 (9th Cir. 1986)
(finding an exigency present when officers received a report of severe welts on the back of a
seven-year-old child and observed the parent scold the boy when he tried to show his back
to the officers).
97. Cf. Lindsey, 877 F.2d at 781-82 (construing the hour delay before the officers
secured plaintiffs’ home as reasonable given that the officers knew of the exigent
circumstances prior to moving in on the location and had no idea that enough time would
allow for obtaining a warrant because they had no way to know backup officers would be
delayed in arriving at the scene).
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5. The 2004 Amendments in Banks Are Much More Comparable to the
Schemes That Failed the Special Needs Analysis in Edmond and Ferguson
The 2004 amendments in the present case are more analogous to the
suspicionless searches that the Court struck down in both Ferguson and
Edmond than the policies upheld in the other special needs exception cases
dealing with schoolchildren, incarcerated prisoners, regulated businesses,
and border searches.98 Just as the Court held that it would never approve of
a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of detecting criminal
wrongdoing, the courts should similarly strike down the 2004 amendments
to the DABEA applied to nonviolent and nonsexual offenders as
unconstitutional suspicionless searches with the general purpose of solving
past and future crimes.99 Just as the Charleston program in Ferguson had
the primary purpose of threatening arrest and prosecution to force pregnant
women into treatment, the primary purpose of the 2004 amendments is to
indefinitely threaten nonviolent and nonsexual offenders with the
possibility of future arrests and prosecution.100 Congress did not enact the
2004 amendments for any safety or regulatory purpose, and, just as the
Supreme Court held in Edmond and Ferguson, these amendments are
unconstitutional because the primary purpose of enacting them is
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.101
C. Even if Courts Find That a Special Need Exists for the 2004
Amendments to the DNA Indexing Statute, the Intrusion on Privacy Rights
Outweighs the Asserted Governmental Interests
If the courts decide that the stated purposes of the 2004 amendments—
creating an identification system of convicted felons, deterrence of future
crime, and assistance in solving past and future crimes—are completely
divorced from an interest in general law enforcement and crime control, the
statistics regarding nonviolent offenders like the plaintiffs in Banks do not
98. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 84 (2001) (holding that the
Charleston program did not fit within the closely guarded category of special needs given its
primary purpose of using the threat of arrest and prosecution in order to force pregnant
women into treatment and the extensive involvement of law enforcement); City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (determining that the Indianapolis narcotics
checkpoint program contravened the Fourth Amendment because its primary purpose was to
uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing against particular individuals).
99. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41 (suggesting that the Court would never credit the
general interest in crime control as a justification for a regime of suspicionless stops).
100. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83 (clarifying that while the ultimate goal of the drug
screening program may have been to get the women into substance abuse treatment and off
drugs, the immediate and unconstitutional objective of the searches was to generate
evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to reach that goal).
101. See generally Herlica, supra note 63, at 967 (characterizing DNA statutes as having
a general crime enforcement purpose rather than a special need because of the lack of proof
of deterrent effect).
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add up to bolster these stated interests.102 Statistics show that ninety-seven
percent of the cases in which investigators used DNA evidence to link a
defendant with a crime involved murder or rape; however, law enforcement
officials later arrest less than one percent of all nonviolent offenders on
murder and rape charges.103 Given these statistics, the government’s
interest in taking DNA samples from nonviolent offenders, as permitted by
the 2004 amendments, is a noncompelling interest that the plaintiffs’
expected privacy rights supercede.104
If the courts find that a special need does exist in the context of testing
nonviolent offenders’ DNA, then it may obviate the individualized
suspicion requirement and employ instead a special needs balancing test.105
This is a fact-specific assessment of the intrusion on the Fourth
Amendment rights of persons searched weighed against the promotion of
governmental interests.106 The Banks District Court was the first to balance
specifically the privacy rights of persons convicted of nonviolent and
nonsexual felonies under this test.107
1. Plaintiffs in Banks, All of Whom Were Serving Terms of Probation or
Supervised Release, Have More Privacy Rights at Stake Than Incarcerated
Prisoners
Plaintiffs in Banks were on terms of probation or supervised release
when subjected to compulsory blood extraction for DNA analysis.108 The
government regularly argues that plaintiffs’ status as convicted felons

102. But see Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992) (“While the court
acknowledges that DNA data may have greater utility for violent crimes, it still finds that its
utility in ALL cases still justifies the minor intrusion.”).
103. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1999) (defending the DNA statute
with studies showing a high rate of recidivism among sexual offenders and how taking DNA
samples from these prisoners will deter them from committing future crimes of a similar
nature).
104. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 313 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting in part) (disagreeing with the
court’s holding that the DNA testing of nonviolent offenders is justified because prisoners
do not lose an expectation of privacy with regard to the intrusion on their bodies involved in
blood testing procedures).
105. See Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1268 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (en banc)
(applying the special needs balancing test to determine that the government’s interest in
collecting DNA from plaintiffs in order to maintain convicted offender profiles in this case
outweighs plaintiffs’ minimal privacy interest in their identifying information).
106. See id. at 1267 (citing Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 669 (2d Cir. 2005))
(articulating the balancing test between the asserted governmental interest and intrusion on
the privacy rights of the individual that must occur in each case once a special need beyond
law enforcement has been established).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1251 (discussing one plaintiff in particular who pled guilty to one count of
using a false social security number and thus was sentenced to fourteen months custody and
three years supervised release).
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restricts the privacy interests they have in their DNA.109 However, the
Ninth Circuit has held that even prisoners retain the fundamental right to
privacy in their bodies while incarcerated.110 If prisoners retain that
privacy right, then certainly plaintiffs on release in Banks retain that same
level of dignity in their own person, if not more.111
Even a more narrow analysis of the 2004 amendments under the Turner
factors used for analyzing prisoners’ rights would lead to the conclusion
that the privacy intrusion outweighs the governmental interests asserted in
the present case. The 2004 amendments, as applied to plaintiffs in Banks,
fail the first Turner factor because, considering the known statistics on
recidivism and DNA success at crime solving, there is no valid, rational
connection between the amendments and the legitimate governmental
interests of convict identification put forward to justify them.112 Second,
there are no ready alternatives for this group of plaintiffs to exercise this
asserted right to privacy and bodily integrity if this scheme of DNA
collection and analysis continues.113 Third, accommodating plaintiffs’
constitutional rights to privacy and bodily integrity will not have any
greater negative effect, but likely a lesser one, on law enforcement
officials, other felons, and plaintiffs’ family members.114 Finally, the
readily available, cheaper, and less invasive alternative of fingerprinting
will still further the asserted governmental interest in creating an index of
convicted felon identities without the overwhelming privacy intrusion into
plaintiffs’ bodily integrity and on plaintiffs’ family members who likely
have similar genetic makeup.115

109. See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 874 (1987) (concluding that probationers
do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled as to searches of their
homes but only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special probation
restrictions for purposes of deterrence and public safety).
110. See Tribble v. Gardner, 860 F.2d 321, 325 (9th Cir. 1988).
111. See, e.g., Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) (observing
that “a parolee has at least as much protection as he had within prison walls” and the right to
bodily privacy is fundamental for all persons).
112. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992) (indicating a less than one
percent chance of arresting any nonviolent offender later on a rape or murder charge
because of the unlikelihood of finding a DNA sample at a nonviolent crime scene).
113. See Beard v. Banks, 126 S.Ct. 2572, 2580 (2006) (finding that the absence of any
alternative to exercise the asserted constitutional right provides some evidence that the
regulations are unreasonable, but is not itself conclusive without looking also at the
problems that might arise in trying to accommodate the asserted right).
114. See id.
115. See id. (upholding the policy because neither the statement nor the deposition
described any alternative method of accommodating the claimant’s constitutional
complaints that fully met the prisoner’s rights at a minimal cost to valid penological
interests).
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2. There is No Sufficient Legitimate Governmental Interest Behind the 2004
Amendments to the DABEA to Justify the Privacy Intrusion
Congress originally passed federal DNA testing to create a database that
would hold the identification of the worst offenders.116 The ninety-seven
percent of cases in which DNA evidence linked a defendant with a crime
involving murder and rape justifies this original purpose.117 The 2004
amendments, however, which extended the DNA Act to nonviolent and
nonsexual offenders, are not justified for the two following reasons: (1) the
low likelihood of recovering a DNA sample from the scene of a nonviolent
crime; and (2) less than one percent of all nonviolent offenders are later
arrested on murder or rape charges.118 These statistics substantially reduce
the importance of the governmental interests in conducting this type of
search on the Banks plaintiffs given the small success rate of solving past
and future crimes dealing with nonviolent offenders.119
Furthermore, even if the government argues that these statistics still
suggest a significant threat to the public, the Supreme Court has held that
the gravity of the threat alone cannot be dispositive of questions concerning
what means law enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given
purpose.120 Instead, courts must consider the nature of all the rights
invaded in light of their connection to the particular law enforcement
practices at issue.121
In his dissenting opinion in Jones, Judge Murnaghan cites United States
Justice Department Statistics from the record that showed that police
officers later arrest only 0.4 percent of nonviolent felons on rape charges
and only 0.8 percent on murder charges.122 Surprisingly, officers later
116. See generally Hulse, supra note 65, at 33 (addressing the fact that Congress
originally created the DABEA to index murderers and rapists because investigators found
more useful DNA samples given the nature of these particular crimes).
117. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 308 (justifying the original purpose of the DNA Act as
applied to violent offenders by giving statistics of the success rate of solving violent crimes
by matching offenders’ DNA to the scene).
118. See Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety Bureau of Criminal Apprehension Forensic Science
Laboratory, Guide to DNA Analysis, http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/Lab/Documents/LabIntro.html (last visited April 1, 2007) (instructing that DNA samples from violent crimes
against persons and relatives of missing persons are the best ones to submit for analysis and
comparison to CODIS profiles).
119. See Jones, 962 F.2d at 314 (recognizing the extremely rare chances of catching a
nonviolent offender because normally he or she will not subsequently commit a violent
crime from which police can recover a DNA sample useful for analysis).
120. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001).
121. See, e.g., City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000) (stating that if the
Court were to decide the case at a high level of generality in apprehending drunk drivers
from the highways, there would be little check on the ability of the authorities to conduct
suspicionless searches by constructing roadblocks for almost any conceivable law
enforcement purpose).
122. Jones, 962 F.2d at 314 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting in part).
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arrest only 0.4 percent of nonviolent drug offenders for rape and only 0.3
percent for murder.123 This statistic is startling considering officers usually
believe this group of offenders more likely than others to commit additional
violent crimes. Regardless if the courts find the government’s asserted
interests in taking and analyzing the DNA of nonviolent offenders
unrelated to law enforcement objectives, testing nonviolent offenders does
not further these goals any more than testing free citizens as evidenced by
these statistics.124
The Banks District Court misinterpreted the weight of these asserted
governmental interests in crime solving and deterrence and should have
held that the suspicionless searches of plaintiffs violated their Fourth
Amendment rights under the balancing prong of the special needs test.125
Unlike the immediacy of the interest in student safety present in both Earls
and Vernonia, there is no such legitimate safety concern in dealing with the
nonviolent and nonsexual offenders in Banks.126 This safety concern for
students and the custodial position of the schoolteachers and
administrators, in light of the students restricted privacy rights, justified the
minimally intrusive urine collection in both Earls and Vernonia.127 In
Banks, there is no concrete evidence that collecting DNA from nonviolent
and nonsexual offenders actually promotes the stated governmental interest
in solving future crime.128 Furthermore, as mentioned before, probationers
and supervised releasees retain more privacy rights than incarcerated
inmates in state prison systems or minor children entrusted to the school
system.129
123. Id. at 314-15.
124. See id. (recognizing that the testing of all citizens, regardless of criminal record,
would give similar statistical likelihood of solving future crimes).
125. See Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1267-68 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (en banc)
(holding that the asserted governmental interests in the general need for maintenance of
identifying information of convicted felons carried the same weight regardless of whether or
not the crime was nonviolent or nonsexual).
126. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834 (2002) (stating that the growing
nationwide drug epidemic among the nation’s youth makes the war against drugs a pressing
concern in every school and justifies steps taken by school administrators, through drug
screenings, to combat drug use by minor children in public schools); Vernonia Sch. Dist.
47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995) (deciding that the student urine sample collection is
necessary and an “important enough” justification of state interests in enforcing drug laws
with school children safety because of the detrimental effects of addiction on youth).
127. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 836-37; Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 660.
128. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 308 (4th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that the greater
utility for use of DNA data lies where the future crime is violent and that those crimes can
statistically relate more directly to inmates now incarcerated for violent crimes).
129. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 831 (affirming that securing order and safety in the school
environment sometimes requires that students be subjected to greater controls by school
officials standing in custodial positions, including minor violations of privacy interests);
Sepulveda v. Ramirez, 967 F.2d 1413, 1416 (9th Cir. 1992) (determining that, as a parolee,
plaintiff had, at a minimum, the same right to bodily privacy that the courts found for prison
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3. The Physical Taking of Plaintiffs’ Blood in Banks Is Grossly More
Intrusive Than Fingerprinting and Is Not Outweighed by the Asserted
Governmental Interests
One argument that the government seems to rely on in Banks can
arguably undermine its asserted interests. The district court in Banks relies
on a passage from Jones that discusses the accuracy of DNA printing and
how a suspect may try to change his or her physical appearance or take on a
new identity but cannot escape his or her DNA print.130 This is hard to
argue with because no person can escape his or her DNA makeup, no
matter how much he or she changes physical appearance.131 However, if
the government’s primary justification for Fourth Amendment intrusion is
difficulty of manipulating evidence, then the already existing, less intrusive
process of fingerprinting felons is accurate enough and also impossible for
a suspect to change or manipulate.132
The district court erred in its balancing analysis in Banks by assuming
that blood extraction procedures caused minimal intrusion and were
equivalent, in this context, to fingerprinting.133 The court concluded that if
all alleged criminals are fingerprinted, and if fingerprinting and DNA
extraction are the same, then expanding DNA analysis to nonviolent and
nonsexual offenders actually convicted of crimes is a justified minimal
intrusion in light of governmental interests in crime control.134
Fingerprinting is less intrusive, safer, and has fewer risks than DNA
indexing.135 Every person has a unique fingerprint.136 However, not all
inmates in shielding their unclothed body from the view of strangers).
130. Banks, 415 F. Supp. 2d at 1264 (citing Jones, 962 F.2d at 307) (asserting that DNA
evidence is more accurate and more difficult to evade than traditional forms of evidence,
such as photographs and fingerprinting).
131. See generally Minn. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, supra note 118, at 1 (discussing the
origin of DNA testing being referred to as DNA fingerprinting because DNA profile
comparisons, like fingerprint comparisons, produce a unique pattern that can identify an
individual).
132. See SUMMARY OF NIST STANDARDS FOR BIOMETRIC ACCURACY, TAMPER
RESISTANCE, AND INTEROPERABILITY 1 (2002) (relying on Immigration and Naturalization
Service data in stating that one index fingerprint can provide a ninety percent probability of
verification with a one percent probability of false acceptance for verification on a sample of
six thousand fingers).
133. See Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 817 (1985) (holding that petitioner’s detention
for the purpose of fingerprinting was subject to the constraints of the probable cause and
warrant requirements of the Fourth Amendment because it permits seizures for the purpose
of fingerprinting only if there is reasonable suspicion that the suspect has committed a
criminal act and fingerprinting will reasonably negate or prove it).
134. See id. at 817-18.
135. See Daniel Levy, M.D., Venipuncture Risks, Aug. 18, 2003, available at http://
health.allrefer.com/health/venipuncture-risks.html (emphasizing the risks of blood
extraction, including excessive bleeding, fainting, hematoma, infection, and multiple
puncture wounds to locate veins).
136. See Andre A. Moenssens, Is Fingerprint Identification a Science?, available at
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Identical twins have an
persons have unique DNA markers.137
indistinguishable genetic makeup, and, therefore, their DNA markers are
impossible to tell apart.138 However, even identical twins have unique
fingerprints from each other.139 Risking a violation of an innocent person’s
rights because his or her DNA is indistinguishable from a convicted
sibling’s is not justified considering the fact that identical twins are not that
rare.140 Thus, the government’s argument that DNA analysis is more
accurate and no more intrusive than fingerprinting is extremely misleading.
Moreover, the risks and intrusiveness of inserting a needle under the
plaintiffs’ skin to draw blood is far greater than that on the students who
were required to urinate into a cup while a school administrator waited
outside the stall.141
4. The Intrusiveness of DNA Analysis Further Outweighs Governmental
Interests Because of the Amount of Information Learned About the Person
Through DNA Use and Maintenance of the Database
The Fourth Circuit, as cited by the district court in Banks, recognized
that the search resulting from taking blood samples is perhaps a greater
intrusion than fingerprinting.142 Yet, the Fourth Circuit further stated that
blood tests are commonplace and the intrusion occasioned by them is not
significant.143 The Fourth Circuit’s argument is misleading because the
http://forensic-evidence.com/site/ID/ID00004_2.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) (asserting
that the friction ridge patterns on the skin exhibit so much variety of detail that no two
patterns are ever found to be exactly the same on the different digits of one certain
individual or of multiple individuals); Edward P. Richards, Phenotype v. Genotype: Why
Identical Twins Have Different Fingerprints, available at http://www.forensic-evidence.
com/site/ID/ID_Twins.html (last visited Apr. 3, 2007) (explaining that fingerprints are part
of an individual’s phenotype, which arises from the interaction of the individual’s genes and
the developmental environment of the uterus).
137. Richards, supra note 136 (discussing how identical twins develop when a single
fertilized egg splits in two, leading to two embryos with identical DNA because they came
from a duplicative combination of the same egg and sperm).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. See Words Work Consulting, Inc., Multiple Births, available at http://wordswork.
com/samples/medical/faq-multiple.html (last visited April 3, 2007) (acknowledging that the
occurrence of identical twins has remained stable throughout the world at between one in
every 250 births and one in every 300 births).
141. Compare Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 658 (1995) (holding that
a drug test involving urinating into a cup to be minimally intrusive), with Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) (concluding that a surgical intrusion under someone’s skin is too
great of a privacy intrusion, even if it is likely to produce evidence of a crime).
142. See Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992).
143. See Brief for Appellant at 8, United States v. Kraklio, No. 06-1369, 2006 WL
842113 (8th Cir. Mar. 3, 2006) (adopting the view that the suspicionless intrusion on the
individual for DNA collection and analysis bears no salient traits of the upheld safety or
regulatory searches and yields a permanent record that exists long after the individual
returns to society and reintegrates as an ordinary citizen).
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blood extraction in question does not take an open or everyday marker of
identity, but rather a wholly personal genetic profile of the individual.144
Moreover, it is important to note that the urine collected for analysis in
both Vernonia and Earls only revealed information about the presence of
certain illegal drugs and did not reveal the depth of detail obtained when
one’s DNA is analyzed and permanently stored in the DNA database.145
When the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit upheld the New York
DNA-indexing statute in Nicholas v. Goord, it did so on the narrow
reasoning that the statute did not provide for sensitive information to be
analyzed or kept in its database.146 The court held this despite conceding
that the second intrusion to which offenders are subjected, the analysis and
maintenance of their DNA, was potentially far greater than the initial
extraction because the state analyzes the DNA for information and
maintains DNA records indefinitely.147
In the same respect, the Banks plaintiffs will have their genetic
information stored for an indefinite period in a national database, accessible
by agencies all over the country, for nonviolent and nonsexual crimes,
placing them in the same category as violent offenders for which Congress
originally created the database.148 Clearly, this is not rolling a person’s
finger in ink and then pressing it on paper, a more painless and less
physically intrusive procedure.149 Taking an individual’s blood, by force or
threat of prosecution if necessary, because of a past nonviolent or
nonsexual crime that will never likely result in solving past or future crimes
is a suspicionless intrusion on his or her body.150
144. See, e.g., Jonathan Kravis, A Better Interpretation of “Special Needs” Doctrine
After Edmond and Ferguson, 112 YALE L. J. 2591, 2598 (2003) (arguing against the
constitutionality of the DNA database because the massive amounts of information about an
individual that is revealed through DNA analysis provides enough weight for courts to
decide that the intrusion outweighs the benefits).
145. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 833 (2002); Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 658.
146. 430 F.3d 652, 670 (2d Cir. 2005) (rebutting the potentially broad level of
information revealed by DNA analysis under the language of the New York statute because
the language of the statute provides only for the analysis of identifying markers and nothing
else, such as medical conditions and other sensitive intelligence).
147. Id. (discussing the greatest concern among the judges as dealing with law
enforcement officials turning DNA samples into profiles capable of being searched
repeatedly throughout the course of an individual’s life, even though the person has
committed no new crimes).
148. See, e.g., Hulse, supra note 65, at 33 (discussing the groups of felons that the
DABEA was originally created to index, including murderers, rapists, robbers, and
kidnappers).
149. See generally Gilbert J. Villaflor, Capping the Government’s Needle: The Need to
Protect Parolee’s Fourth Amendment Privacy Interests From Suspicionless DNA Searches
in United States v. Kincade, 38 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 2347 (2005) (asserting that the Ninth
Circuit’s characterization of the intrusion of a blood test as minimal diverts attention from
the true depth of information obtained about the individual through the blood sample).
150. See DNA Analysis Backlog Elimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2006) (providing
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D. The DNA Database is Further Unconstitutional as Applied to the
Privacy Rights of Innocent Family Members That It Inevitably Implicates
In Banks, the plaintiffs were five individuals serving terms of probation
or supervised release for convictions of nonviolent and nonsexual crimes.
While permitting restrictions on prisoners’ privacy rights, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly reaffirmed the principle that “prisons are not beyond
the reach of the Constitution.”151 Moreover, if the Constitution protects
people inside of prisons, it certainly protects persons outside of prison
walls on supervised release or probation.152 With the district court
upholding the 2004 amendments as justified intrusions on these plaintiffs’
privacy rights, a closer look is needed to analyze exactly whose rights the
DNA database violates.153 The plaintiffs in Banks brought a Fourth
Amendment challenge against the 2004 amendments, but their family
members who had committed no crimes, because of the genetic traits of
DNA analysis, may also have had privacy rights at stake.154
1. The DNA Database Reaches Privacy Rights of Innocent Family
Members of Indexed Persons Because of the Close Genetic Ties Between
Family Members
Close genetic ties between family members may result in an individual’s
DNA potentially revealing information about that individual’s family
members.155 Thus, the DNA testing that implicates the Fourth Amendment
rights of nonviolent and nonsexual offenders may also implicate those
same rights of the offender’s family members, who have no history of
criminal activity.156 A daunting outcome reached by the Fourth Circuit in
Jones construed previous decisions as instructing that blood testing can be
for punishment of a class A misdemeanor or in accordance with title 18, United States Code,
if an individual fails to cooperate with DNA collection under the statute).
151. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984); see Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302,
313 (4th Cir. 1992) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting in part) (recognizing that while restricted,
prisoners still retain many constitutional rights and that the lacking expectation of privacy in
a prison cell does not extend to losing the reasonable expectation of privacy in a prisoner’s
bodily fluids).
152. See United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1102 n.20 (9th Cir. 2003) rev’d en
banc, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
153. See Michelle Hibbert, DNA Databanks: Law Enforcement’s Greatest Surveillance
Tool?, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 767, 782 (1999).
154. See id. at 783 (discounting the FBI’s use of mitochondrial DNA for analysis
because it provides a lesser degree of uniqueness, as shown by all of a woman’s offspring
having the same mitochondrial DNA sequence, thus creating potential privacy interests for
family members).
155. See id.
156. See id. (speculating about the implications on nonindexed family members with a
situation in which a sibling commits a crime and is compelled to provide a DNA sample,
and later officers lift a DNA fingerprint from a crime scene that leads not to the convicted
sibling, but to his non-indexed brother or sister).
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reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, even with respect to free persons,
where the governmental interests advanced by the slight intrusion outweigh
its significance.157
In a 1995 Indiana case, an indexed convicted felon was initially a
principal suspect in a rape and robbery, but his DNA in the database did not
sufficiently match that recovered from the crime scene.158 The tests on his
DNA sample instead suggested that the perpetrator was his close relative.159
Eventually, police arrested the indexed felon’s brother and a court
convicted him of rape.160 Some may consider the brother’s conviction a
success because it put a rapist behind bars, but this case is an example of
why the government’s justifications of deterrence and prevention of
recidivism through use of DNA databases do not pass muster.161 Through
the DNA database, the government had access to nonindexed family
members of a convicted felon.162 Although many jurisdictions have stated
that the importance of crime prevention justifies the possibility of intruding
on the rights of free citizens, the Supreme Court has steadfastly rejected
this claim in its Edmond and Ferguson decisions.163
2. Implicated Innocent Family Members’ Privacy Expectations Further
Outweigh Asserted Governmental Interests in the DNA Database Under the
Balancing Test
If a court applies the special needs balancing test to the nonindexed
family members of convicted felons in the database, the privacy intrusion
on their Fourth Amendment rights outweighs the governmental interest in
crime solving and prevention even more than in the case of probationers

157. Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307 (4th Cir. 1992) (discussing prior case law that
authorizes the minor intrusion of blood extraction with “little risk, trauma, or pain” even
from free citizens, when outweighed by governmental interests in detecting diseases or drug
use).
158. Flowers v. Indiana, 654 N.E.2d 1124, 1124 (Ind. 1995) (per curiam) (addressing the
scenario leading up to the adjudication of the plaintiff on rape and robbery charges, which
began when his brother, a prime suspect in the rape, provided a sample of his blood, with
the resulting DNA analysis directing police to the plaintiff, who was not a convicted felon).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See Hibbert, supra note 153, at 784 (inferring possible public sentiment towards any
injustice in the intrusion on the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment privacy rights because it
resulted in taking a rapist off the streets).
162. See id. (noting that the governmental justifications for compulsory DNA collection
do not apply to indexed individual’s family members because they have committed no crime
that warrants that level of privacy intrusion).
163. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 86 (2001) (citing City of
Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42-43 (2000)) (holding that the gravity of the threat of
drunk driving alone cannot justify law enforcement engaging in searches of vehicles without
individualized suspicion to obtain evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing).
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and supervised releasees.164 A person retains the right to be safe and secure
from governmental intrusion into his bodily integrity.165 The Supreme
Court has persistently upheld this right with regard to free citizens with no
prior convictions, incarceration, or probation terms, as one that the
government cannot violate unless there is probable cause or reasonable
articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.166 If no individualized
suspicion that a person is involved in a criminal activity exists with regard
to free citizens, a search of their identity or bodily fluids contravenes the
Fourth Amendment.167 In the present case of DNA databanks, an identical
twin of a databanked felon will have his or her exact genetic makeup
searched every time a government official accesses the database.168 Even
nonidentical twins and ordinary siblings may have their respective genome
and identifying DNA sequence searched if they are related to a convicted
felon in the DNA database.169 Because the use and maintenance of a DNA
database infringes on the rights of innocent family members, the Banks
District Court erred in holding that the privacy rights at stake do not
outweigh the asserted governmental interests.170
CONCLUSION
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma
misapplied the special needs test to the challenge brought by plaintiffs in
Banks v. Gonzales.171 The 2004 amendments to the DABEA, as applied to
164. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878-83 (1975) (reasoning that
the constitutionality of seizures of free persons involves a weighing of the gravity of the
public concerns served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty).
165. See York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 455 (9th Cir. 1963) (establishing the right to
bodily privacy by stating that the “desire to shield one’s unclothed figure from the view of
strangers . . . is impelled by elementary self-respect and personal dignity”).
166. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968) (asserting that the inestimable right of
personal security granted by the Fourth Amendment belongs as much to the citizen walking
the streets as to the person hiding his affairs within his home).
167. See id. at 21 (emphasizing that the police officer must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, warrant a
particular intrusion on a person’s rights).
168. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 5 (indicating that DNA
analysis and the database are powerful tools because each person’s DNA is unique, with the
exception of identical twins).
169. See Hibbert, supra note 153, at 782 (discussing the fact that even siblings who are
not identical twins will share DNA and “have some 1:256 chance of having the exact same
DNA across four loci”).
170. See Banks v. Gonzales, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1267-68 (N.D. Okla. 2006) (en banc)
(finding that the asserted governmental interests in building a DNA database and creating a
DNA identification index to assist in solving crimes outweighed plaintiffs’ Fourth
Amendment rights, as probationers and supervised releasees, against unreasonable searches
and seizures).
171. See id. at 1266 (holding that the interest in the desire to build a DNA database,
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nonviolent and nonsexual offenders, are unconstitutional because they do
not relate to special needs outside of general law enforcement and crime
control.172 Instead, the Attorney General and House Report remarking on
the statute maintained that the purpose behind expanding the database is to
make it much easier to match DNA fingerprints in cases where there are no
suspects, and thus in effect to perform searches of individuals’ identities
without individualized suspicion.173 This powerful tool directly relates to
helping law enforcement combat crime without needing probable cause, or
even a reasonable suspicion, that evidence of criminal wrongdoing
exists.174 Furthermore, this invasion of Fourth Amendment rights greatly
outweighs the governmental interest in solving past and future crimes
because of both the depth of information that is obtained and permanently
stored, and the implications and intrusive outcomes it may have on
nonindexed family members.175 The Supreme Court should reconsider the
issue of DNA databanking statutes in light of the 2004 amendments to the
DABEA that extended the scope of the Act to nonviolent and nonsexual
offenders. The Court should apply the special needs test and find that law
enforcement violates the privacy interests of nonviolent and nonsexual
offenders, as well as their family members, considering the nonlegitimate
governmental interest in solving crime in the context of nonviolent crimes
against property.176

furthered by the 2004 amendments to the DABEA, is not tied to the type of crime
committed and thus falls within the special needs exception as to all felonies).
172. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 4 (asserting that the
tendency for states to include all convicted felons in their databases dramatically increases
the database’s utility for law enforcement to investigate criminal activity).
173. See id. (describing the process of using DNA to identify a suspect, by comparing
evidence collected from the crime scene with a known standard).
174. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(Reinhardt, J., dissenting) (reiterating that when evaluating the reasonableness of a
suspicionless search, where the immediate objective is to generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes, the search is unconstitutional).
175. See Hibbert, supra note 153, at 782-83.
176. See UNITED STATES DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 62, at 3 (assessing the success of
solving previous crimes and preventing future ones in the context of the recidivistic nature
of violent offenders).
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